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DECLINING HOMICIDE IN NEW YORK
CITY: A TALE OF TWO TRENDS
JEFFREY FAGAN,* FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,*"
AND JUNE KIM""
The mass media pay plenty of attention to crime and vio-
lence in the United States, but very few of the big stories on the
American crime beat can be classified as good news. The drive-
by shootings and carjackings that illuminate nightly news
broadcasts are the opposite of good tidings. Most efforts at pre-
vention and law enforcement seem more like reactive attempts
to contain ever expanding problems rather than discernable
public triumphs. In recent American history, crime rates seem
to increase on the front page and moderate in obscurity.
The recent decline in homicides in New York City is an ex-
ception to the usual pattern, the most celebrated example of
crime-news-as-good-news in decades. No doubt part of the pub-
lic attention can be explained because the story took place in
the media capital of the United States. But more than location
made the New York story newsworthy. The drop in homicides
was both large and abrupt-the homicide rate in the nation's
largest city fell 52% in five years. Further, changes in police
manpower and strategy are widely believed to have contributed
to the decline. If this drop can be. plausibly tied to enforcement
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activities, it would be the most conspicuous success of city police
deployment policies in the twentieth century.
This article reports our attempt to assess the extent and
causes of the five-year decline in life threatening violence in
New York City. Part I puts the homicide decline in a variety of
statistical contexts, comparing the drop to previous New York
experience and to the experiences of other cities in the United
States. Part II examines changes in patterns of homicide during
the decline in search of clues about causes. Part III examines
available data on crime trends and trends in crime-related phe-
nomena over the years when homicide increased and declined.
Did many crime categories fall, and by how much? Was the de-
cline concentrated in a few categories or spread evenly across
the spectrum of felony crime? What were contemporaneous
trends in drug use, demography, and incarceration? Part IV re-
views some explanations of the decline.
I. HowBIGADROP?
This section places the five-year decline in New York City
homicide in a variety of historical contexts. How large is this
drop compared to previous periods in the history of New York
City? Is a drop this substantial a typical event in the history of a
big city?
One important element of context for studying the New
York City experience is the recent history of homicide rates in
the United States. Figure 1.1 provides national level homicide
rates by year over the period 1950-95.
After steady to declining trends until the early 1960s, the
homicide rate doubled in the period from 1964-74 from just
under 5 per 100,000 at the beginning of that period to just un-
der 10 per 100,000 in 1974. After 1974, the trend over time ap-
pears to be fluctuations around the 1974 high. Homicide
dropped somewhat in the mid-1970s then climbed back up to
just above 10 per 100,000 in 1980, dropped in the early 1980s,
then climbed back up close to the 1980 high point in the early
1990s only to drop off again after 1991.
If all the homicide trends since 1964 were forced into a sin-
gle trend line, the direction of the trend would be upward. If
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the doubling of rate prior to 1975 is plotted separately, however,
the two decades since 1975 represent a trendless fluctuation
down from the new peak rate of 10 per 100,000 per year and
then back up. By 1995, the homicide rate had dropped back
near but not yet below the twenty-year low set in 1984.
The New York City history can be briefly stated. In its rela-
tive and absolute magnitude, the homicide drops after 1992
were by far the largest in the postwar history of New York City.
The second largest percentage drop was 25% from 1981-1985.
The number of lives involved is even more impressive, with
more than 1,100 fewer homicide victims in New York City in
1996 than in 1992. This reduction in homicide far exceeded
the total number of homicides the city experienced each year in
the 1950s and early 1960s.
The comparison of this New York experience with the expe-
rience of other cities is a more complicated story. Figure 1.2
begins the analysis by reporting on the largest five-year declines
in homicides reported since 1945 in each of the fifteen largest
cities in the United States as of 1950.
The five-year records for big cities vary from a 61% decline
in Pittsburgh through a 15% decline in Chicago. The median
decline was 40% and seven cities reported highest decline per-
centages between 43% and 38%. The New York decline is the
third highest for the major cities, behind Pittsburgh, equal to
Houston, and about 25% larger than the cluster of city records
around 40%. Based on straight arithmetic, the New York expe-
rience is not unprecedented, but is a higher percentage drop
than twelve of the nation's fifteen biggest cities have experi-
enced in a five-year span.
There are two other city comparisons that help to illumi-
nate the relative standing of the New York City decline. Figure
1.3 drops the constraint of a five-year span and searches for the
largest homicide declines in a decade or less for each of the
thirteen largest cities in 1950.
New York City's five-year drop maintains its position as the
third largest in this comparison, but a much larger number of
cities record declines of the same general magnitude of New
1280 [Vol. 88
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York's 51%. It is worth noting, however, that the very largest cit-
ies in the United States other than New York City have more
modest percentage declines than the smaller cities. New York
City's population greatly exceeds Houston's, the next largest city
with a similar relative homicide decline.
Figure 1.4 tests the five cities with the highest five-year de-
clines against the hypothesis that an abnormally high homicide
rate for a short period of time is the reason for a large drop in
the homicide rate. The low year in the largest five-year decline
is compared to the mean rate in that city for the previous fifteen
years.
Figure 1.4 helps the observer tell the difference between a
big drop that occurs when a city rate returns to near historically
normal rates from an atypical high level and declines that still
look dramatic when compared with homicide in a city over the
long term.
Three of the five largest declines (including New York City)
represent a substantial reduction from the average rate in the
previous fifteen years. For Pittsburgh, Houston, and New York
City, it is difficult to argue that the drops recorded were merely
regression from abnormally high rates. The Boston decline, by
contrast, was only to a point 11% below the previous long-term
mean. Regression is a much more likely explanation in that
case.
There is one further measure of possible regression relevant
to our inquiry. In an era when very wide swings in rates of
criminal homicide occur, sharp downward movements in the
homicide rate might be expected after sharp upward move-
ments. The theory here is that some downward momentum
might be expected after a steep climb in homicide rates for the
same reason that rollercoasters tend to drop faster when they
have climbed to a great height. The 59% drop in Houston
homicides after 1991 came after a sharp increase in rate. Be-
tween 1987 and 1991, Houston's homicide rate climbed from
18.5 per 100,000 to 36.3-a 96% increase. Viewed against this
background, both the swiftness and the extent of the decline is
less astonishing. When measured against the previous low point
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in 1987, the Houston homicide rate had declined 19.6% instead
of 59%, from 18.5 to 14.9 per 100,000. Moreover, the first year
in which the Houston homicide was lower than its 1987 level was
1995, three years after the decline started. The real possibility
of cyclical variations means that Houston may not have broken
out of its long-term pattern until late in the current decline, and
that the current homicide level is only modestly lower than the
previous low. Similar measures can be found in Dallas, where a
58% decline in homicide brought the 1996 homicide rate to
23% under the city's 1983 rate.
How does New York City fare on this measure? To use the
rollercoaster metaphor, the climb in New York City was not as
steep prior to the post-1991 drop, so that less of the New York
decline seems likely to be merely cyclical. Between 1985 and
1991, New York City's homicide rate had increased 56% from
17.5 to 27.3 per 100,000. The homicide rate in 1996 was 23%
below the 1985 rate, so that about half of the decrease noted by
1996 was outside the range of cyclical variations experienced in
the recent past in New York City.
Still, much of the New York decline could have been cycli-
cal, and this possibility constrains our capacity to explain the
homicide decline on other grounds, or to time with precision
when New York homicide started behaving in non-cyclical fash-
ion. As late as the end of 1995, the New York homicide rate was
within 10% of its 1985 level. The rate of lethal violence broke
important new ground only after 1995 or 1996.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this brief ex-
cursion into the natural history of homicide rates in U.S. cities.
The percentage decline experienced in New York in five years is
quite large but by no means unprecedented in major cities.
The largest five-year drop in the average major city since the
Second World War is about 40%-a figure 20% smaller than
New York City's. When declines over a six- to nine-year span are
allowed, six other cities produce declines of a magnitude similar
to the New York experience at some point in post-war history.
These declines usually come after periods of general increase in
homicide rates. The most common year as a starting point for a
19981 1285
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city's record decline was 1980, the highest year in U.S. homicide
for at least a half century.
Declines of the magnitude experienced in New York City
are not unprecedented, but they are not very common either.
Only two other large cities exceed the New York percentage de-
cline at any time in the post-war era. The New York record far
exceeded the short-term drops recorded in any other city with a
population of more than two million. And the large difference
between the 1996 homicide rate in New York City and the pre-
vious fifteen years of homicide make a strong case against re-
gression as a major part of the explanation for the five-year
decline. So the decline is large by historical standards and not
merely an echo of a sharp but temporary previous rise. None of
this goes directly to the question of what may have caused the
New York drop. We have first attempted to get an accurate
measure of the size of the effect we are studying.
The next section shifts attention from the number of homi-
cides occurring in New York City to an account of the different
trends for different types of killings. The theory is that shifts in
the types of homicides that take place can provide clues as to
why the change has occurred.
II. THE NATURE OF THE HOMICIDE DECLINE
The homicide statistics discussed in the previous section are
an aggregation of many different types of attack, many different
community areas, and many different population groups that
live in New York City. This section will analyze the types of
homicide that have changed the most, in order to search for
clues as to the probable causes of the changes. The analysis re-
ports on cross-tabulations of New York City homicide over time
by borough, by weapon, and by demographic groups in the city.
Each of these disaggregations produces findings we believe to
be of major importance in interpreting the NewYork story.
A. VARIATIONS BY BOROUGH
One important approach to disaggregating New York homi-
cide rates is by borough. The four major boroughs in the city-
Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and the Bronx-each have a
1286 [Vol. 88
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population that would rank in the top ten U.S. cities. These
four urban assemblages differ importantly from each other in
economy, culture, population, and many other community
characteristics. A natural question to ask is whether the homi-
cide decline has been spread evenly over these four clusters or
has been uneven in impact.
Figure 2.1 approaches this question by taking the average
annual homicide count for each of the four large boroughs for
the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 and expressing each year's
homicide over the period 1985-95 as a percentage of that base.
If the homicide count in Manhattan during 1989 was 25% more
than the annual average during 1985-1987, the index for 1989
homicide in Manhattan will be 125 on the figure. This strategy
is adopted to facilitate comparing the trends over time in the
four boroughs. Staten Island is deleted from the analysis.
The four different boroughs differ importantly in the pat-
terns observed while homicide rates grew in New York City, but
are much less divergent during the years of decline. The peak
volume of homicide in Manhattan was 35% greater than the
1985-1987 average, while Queens and Brooklyn grew 64 and
69% and the Bronx grew 93%. These were large differences in
growth rate that were accompanied by a slight difference in tim-
ing. The peak year in Manhattan and the Bronx was 1990, while
Brooklyn and Queens had their highest levels in 1991. Still, the
temporal pattern during the late 1980s and early 1990s was
pretty consistent across boroughs.
The boroughs are even more parallel in the period of de-
cline. Even though the increases were very uneven across the
boroughs, each of them experienced close to a 50% drop from
the high value of the decade by 1995. The 1995 volume of
homicide in the four boroughs ranges from 47% of the high for
the Bronx to 50.6% of the high value in Queens. The extent of
the increase had no discernable impact on the proportionate
homicide decline. This pattern seems the obverse of the saying
that a rising tide lifts all boats.
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The significant division of homicides in New York by
weapon is between gunshot deaths and all others. The best data
available on homicide by weapon over time comes from the Of-
fice of the Medical Examiner, which includes a small category of
justifiable killings but otherwise should be parallel to the police
data. Figure 2.2 shows the pattern by weapon using the 675
nongun killings in 1995 and the 834 gun killings in that year as
a base of 100 to track trends over time. The nongun total for
1990 has been adjusted by deleting 85 of the 86 killings from
the Happyland Social Club fire, in effect counting that episode
as one homicide. This is done to smooth out the long-term
trend curve.
In Figure 2.2, the patterns for gun and nongun killings are
sharply different. Nongun killings drift downward from the be-
ginning, interrupted only in 1990 by the 86 fire deaths in a sin-
gle incident. By 1992, nongun deaths had dropped by 35%, and
this trend continued through to 1996. Gun deaths meanwhile
doubled between 1985 and 1991 and did not fall back to the
1985 level until 1995.
The gun death pattern is well known, and the rise in homi-
cide by gun was large enough in the late 1980s and early 1990s
to increase the total level of homicide until 1990 in the medical
examiner's data, and to keep total homicide high through 1993.
What the gun trends obscure is the steadiest long-term trend in
New York City-a downward movement in homicides by all
means other than gun that began after 1986 and gathered mo-
mentum steadily throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. By
1992, 70% of the total decline in nongun killings noted in the
entire 1985-1996 period had already occurred. The declines af-
ter 1992 in nongun killings appear to have been a continuation
of the eight years of previous decreases.
There are thus two dynamic and different patterns in the
data on homicide by weapon. Gun killings first increase then
fall back to previous levels. Nongun killings trend down from
start to finish. The magnitude of the nongun trend is substan-
tial and its timing is well documented. But it has not previously
been noticed.
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C. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF HOMICIDE
The distinct patterns of gun and nongun homicide raise
questions about whether these patterns were similarly distrib-
uted among the population of homicide victims. Using the
Medical Examiner records, we disaggregated characteristics of
gun and nongun homicide victims by age, sex, and race. The
demographic patterns of gun and nongun homicide through-
out this period tell two interesting stories. First, the homicide
trends for women differ from the patterns for men, a gender
contrast consistent with prior studies on the stability of female
homicide. Second, changes in adolescent homicide rates were
accompanied by parallel but less dramatic changes among the
older population. This trend varies from the national picture of
steadily declining rates among older groups.
1. Sex
Homicide rates for women were lower overall from 1985
through 1995, consistent with homicide trends historically.
However, the trends in gun and nongun homicides for males
and females differed in the magnitude, timing, and duration of
change over the period. Figure 2.3 shows that gun homicides by
women increased by 68% during this period, compared to an
increase of over 105% for males. The timing and duration of
the increase for females was similar to that of males. Rates for
women peaked in 1991, the same year as males, and sustained
their peak rate for approximately three years before dropping
sharply in 1994. By 1995, gun homicides for females had
dropped 5% below their 1985 levels, but remained 10% above
the 1985 levels for males.
The steady decline in nongun homicides described earlier
was not consistent for men and women. Figure 2.3 shows that
there were steady declines for both groups, but the decline was
greater for men than women. By 1995, nongun homicide rates
for males were 45% below their 1985 rates.1 However, the rates
'The 1990 spike for male nongun homicides most likely reflects the 89 deaths in
the Happyland Social Club fire. However, we could not adjust the rates for these
deaths since data were not available on the gender composition of the victims of that
fire.
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for women declined far less. After reaching a low of 25% below
their 1985 rate in 1992, they settled at about 80% by 1995. In
fact, the overall trend for women has not changed since 1992.
2. Age
Much of public and scholarly attention on violence in the
past decade has focused on the increase in gun homicides by
adolescents.2 Trends nationwide show that gun homicide rates
for adolescents increased during this period while gun homi-
cide rates for persons over twenty-five years of age were declin-
ing. Figure 2.4 shows that while adolescent participation in gun
homicide did rise sharply from 1985-1991, rates for other age
groups also continued to rise during this period.3
Gun homicides by adolescents ages 15-19 rose more quickly
and sharply over this period. By 1991, the gun homicide rate
for this group reached a peak of 176% above its 1985 rate. The
other population groups also increased, peaking at approxi-
mately the same time at about 100% above their 1985 rates.
Rates for the oldest population group, those thirty-five-years-of-
age or more, rose slightly more slowly, peaking at 77% over
their 1985 rate. Accordingly, adolescents became an active part
of a homicide epidemic that spanned age groups.
The decline among adolescents was equally precipitous. By
1995, adolescent homicide counts declined to 25% above their
1985 base rate. All other population groups returned to their
1985 rates or declined below those rates.
2 See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, Youth Vrolence, Guns, and the Illicit Drug Industry, 86 J.
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995); Phillip Cook & John Laub, The Unprecedented
Epidemic in Youth Vzolence, in M. TONRY& M. MOORE, YOUTHVIOLENCE (1998).
" We include only homicide victims ages 15 and above. The gun homicide counts
for those 14-years-old and younger were extremely low during this period, and their
participation in nongun homicide exceeded gun homicide by 50% or more.
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Figure 2.5 shows that the nongun homicide rates during
this period declined for all age groups. We excluded the 1990
data, since age distributions of the Happyland Social Club fire
victims were unavailable. The oldest and youngest age groups
contributed proportionally to the nongun homicide decline
from 1985-1989. By 1991, the decline was evident among all age
groups.
3. Race
None of the data sources permitted detailed disaggregation
of the homicide trends by race over the entire 1985-1995 pe-
riod. Detailed data were available only for African-Americans;
whites and Hispanics were not distinguished in the police or
Medical Examiner data until after 1990. From the available
data, there were no changes in the racial composition of the
homicide population during this period. Data from several
sources show that homicide rates among African-Americans
were higher compared to others throughout the period from
1985-1995. 4
III. CONCOMITANTS
This section compares the city-wide homicide data developed in
the previous section with trends in crime statistics and selected
other social data widely believed to be linked to trends in lethal
violence. City-wide data comparisons are presented because of
the finding in the previous section that trends are consistent in
time and, with one minor exception, in magnitude, over New
York's four large metropolitan boroughs. The historical data
One data source does provide race-disaggregated information on weapon-related
fatalities and injuries, but only from 1990-95. Sharp declines in firearm assault inju-
ries and fatalities were observed for all races from 1990-95, according to the Injury
Surveillance System of the New York City Department of Health. The surveillance sys-
tem hierarchically combines case-level data on fatalities, hospitalizations, and emer-
gency room admissions. OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, SUMMARY OF
VrrAL STATISTICS, 1996, THE CrIy OF NEw YORK (1997). Firearm death and nonfatal
injury rates declined by 50% or more for both Blacks and Hispanics from 1991 to
1995. Rates for whites also declined, but at a slower pace. Rates of nonfirearm deaths
and injuries declined more slowly for all races during this period.
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for gun and nongun violence is presented separately in this sec-
tion because, as discussed in the previous section, gun and non-
gun homicides have distinctly different histories in the city.
The first part of this section compares homicide trends with
trends in police reported assaults. The second part measures
the trends in gun and nongun homicide with trends in other
crimes.
A. HOMICIDE AND ASSAULT DATA
The pattern over time for firearms homicide and firearms
assault is shown in Figure 3.1, with 1985 rates of shooting deaths
and firearms assaults expressed as 100 and all other values nor-
med to that scale.
The trends in police reported gun assaults and health de-
partment gun homicides are almost perfectly matched for the
six years of increase to 1991, and for the decreases thereafter.
In both timing and relative magnitude, the firearm assault
trends match the firearm homicide trends. For this time pe-
riod, trends in known firearm assaults are a very good index of
trends in gun deaths. The case fatality rate of gun death per
each ten gun assaults is stable over time. The increased level of
firearm assaults, about 8,600 more known cases by 1990 and
1991, appears to be the mechanism that is driving the increase
in gun fatalities, and the sharp drop in firearms assaults after
1993 seems to be the dynamic in the drop in firearms fatalities,
although no strict test for causal ordering can be imposed on
this data.
The data on nonfirearm aggravated assault trends and
health department homicides by all means other than firearms
are an extraordinary contrast to the firearms trends, as shown in
Figure 3.2.
For most of the period, trends in nonfirearm aggravated as-
saults are a very poor index of trends in nonfirearm homicides:
while the rate of death drops by half in the period from 1985-
1995, the incidence of aggravated assault increases slightly. As a
consequence of these sharply divergent trends, the case fatality
rate drops from 16 per 1,000 in 1985 to 8 per 1,000 in 1995.
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Obviously, any increase in total aggravated assaults during this
period would have to be clustered in nonlife-threatening types
of attack.
There is, however, a good reason to suppose that the growth
in nongun aggravated assault cases is solely the product of
greater willingness to classify borderline cases as the aggravated
form of assault. At the national level, assault rates have grown
over the same period much more quickly than any change in
death rates could explain. So New York may simply be reflect-
ing this national reclassification tendency.5
1. One Trend or Two?
An objection might be raised that the major finding of this
study-the two separate trends in nongun and gun homicides-
is really an artificial division of a unitary trend in violence over
the period. The decline in nongun killings that starts in the
mid-1980s is merely a shift from knife and personal force attacks
to gun attacks. A proponent of this view might argue that there
is no real reduction in violence to explain until after 1990, when
total killings and presumably total high lethality attacks start to
come down. Now that weapon-specific assault data has been
added to the homicide story, this possible objection can be ad-
dressed with some economy.
The circumstantial evidence against this possibility comes
from many separate sources. In the first place, while gun deaths
doubled between 1985 and 1992, a shift in the volume of knife,
other weapon, and personal force attacks that was large enough
to reduce the nongun homicide rate by 35% would be expected
to increase the gun death total by at least 150%. This is because
the case fatality rate in 1985 for gun assaults was 88 per 1,000
compared to 16 per 1,000 for the nongun assaults in New York
in 1985. Given the instrumentality effects, the increase in fire-
arms death was too small to fit with a displacement rather than
decline in nongun violence. Nongun high lethality violence
had to be coming down in the second half of the 1980s.
" FRANKLUN ZIMRING, AMERIcANYOUTH VIOLENcE 38-45 (1998).
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A second problem with attributing the increase in gun inci-
dents in New York City to the same violent incidents now occur-
ring with guns rather than other weapons of attack is that this is
inconsistent with the prevailing explanation for increased gun
attacks in the late 1980s. The conventional wisdom is that gun
incidents increased in large part because of turf conflict in the
new crack trade.6 If new types of conflict explain much of the
growth in gun violence, that would leave even less of the gun
cases to explain as the effects of displacement.
A third problem with the late 1980s pattern as a reciprocal
displacement story is that the timing of the two trends is incon-
sistent with reciprocity. The two largest increases in gun homi-
cide in the late 1980s occurred in 1988 and 1990. The biggest
declines in nongun homicide happened in 1987 and 1992.
A fourth problem with a reciprocity explanation for the first
seven years after 1985 is that the nongun homicide trends con-
tinued in a relatively uninterrupted fashion after 1992 as well.
The magnitude of the drops in nongun killing after 1991 are
quite consistent with the nongun pattern in the late 1980s, yet
the increases in gun killings disappeared. An observer would
have to maintain grossly different explanations for the front end
years of the trend and the later years, despite the similarity in
over-all pattern for the eleven years.
There is also evidence external to New York City that ex-
panding gun homicide levels are not associated with declines in
nongun violence. While gun homicide tends to increase more
in up years than other weapon killings, and is also over-
represented in declines, the nongun trends tend to be flat
rather than to fluctuate in the opposite direction.7
Even granting the anomalous trend data for nongun as-
saults throughout the period, it should also be mentioned that
the police nonfatal assault data just reviewed is also grossly in-
6 See eg., Blumstein, supra note 2. See also PHULIPPE J. BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF
RESPECT: SELLING CRACKIN EL BARRIO (1995).
7 For the United States as a whole, see Franklin E. Zirnring, Firearms and Federal
Laur The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 133 n.2 (1975). For youth violence,
see Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epi-
demic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1996).
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consistent with any reciprocity explanation of the decline in
nongun violence in the late 1980s. More reliable nonfatal as-
sault data for the 1980s would help us put a more precise point
on the independence of the gun and nongun trends, but the
pattern seems clear on available evidence. A long decline in
nonfirearms lethal violence continued throughout the period
under study. In twelve years, the death rate dropped steadily
until the 1996 rate was almost exactly half the 1985 rate.
Meanwhile, homicide by gun increased substantially and
then decreased even more swiftly. The two homicide trends oc-
curred in the same city but appear to be independent of each
other, at least through the early 1990s and perhaps for the
whole period under study.
B. OTHER CRIME TRENDS
Patterns of both robbery and property crime reflect the "two
trend" finding in homicide, but the timing is not identical. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the trends for firearm and other armed robberies
for 1985-1996, again using the 1985 incidence as the base.8 Fig-
ure 3.4 shows property crime trends. The pattern of firearm
robbery during this period is similar to the patterns of firearm
assault and homicide, peaking in 1990 before declining sharply.
The general decline in nonfirearm homicide is mirrored by the
trend for property crimes and nonfirearm robberies, though the
phasing of their decline differs by about two years.
The incidence of firearm robberies peaked in 1990, at 63%
above the 1985 rate. This peak maintained for twelve months
through 1991, before declining sharply through 1996. By 1996,
the incidence of gun robberies was 47% lower than the 1985 in-
dex, a decline that substantially outperforms the gun homicide
and assault trends. The trend for nonfirearm robberies more
closely resembles the firearm crime trends generally. These
robberies peaked in 1989 at 37% above the 1985 rate, and by
1996 declined to a point 25% below the 1985 rate.
8 The data point for the base year is greater than 100. The within-year fluctuations
require smoothing of the curve based on moving averages of six-month periods.
Thus, the initial data point actually includes the index for 18 months, or fromJanuary
1985 throughJune 1986.
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At first glance, this trend appears to contradict the "two
trends" finding from the homicide and assault data. One could
conclude that these data portray a more unitary violence phe-
nomenon during the period, with rates rising and falling in
concert. However, there are two objections to this coupling of
firearm and other robberies in a general violence trend. First,
the robbery trend beginning in 1989 mirrors identically the
"two trends" conclusion in homicides. From a high in 1989,
nonfirearm robberies began an uninterrupted decline to an in-
cidence 52% below the peak. Thus, what differs in the robbery
trends is the phasing of the trend, not its shape or magnitude.
Though beginning somewhat later, the decline in nonfirearm
robberies is otherwise quite similar to the decline in nonfirearm
homicides.
Second, robbery itself is a heterogeneous crime, with acts
ranging from chain snatching to threats or acts of violence to
take property from a person. The growth in nonfirearm robber-
ies from 1985-1989 may reflect a reclassification of borderline
cases similar to the nonfirearm assault trends. That is, theft or
larceny (without force) cases could be reclassified as robberies
in circumstances where threats may be reported. As we show in
Figure 3.4, the incidence of larcenies rose slightly during this
period, suggesting a general trend of property crime increases
that may confound these two crime categories.
Property crime trends are shown in Figure 3.4. Motor vehicle
theft spiked in 1989 at over 150% of its 1985 incidence, before
declining precipitously through 1996. By 1996, auto theft was
25% below its 1985 rate, and nearly two-thirds below its peak in-
cidence in 1988. Burglary trends declined steadily throughout
the period, part of a long-term trend in burglary that dates back
to the late 1970s. The incidence of burglary in 1996 is 50%
lower than the 1985 incidence. 9
Larceny patterns, by comparison, are very stable, rising only
9 Data on insurance claims confirm the decline in reports of auto theft and resi-
dential burglary. We obtained information from State Farm Insurance, the third
largest underwriter of both automobile and homeowners insurance policies in New
York City, on claims and settlements from 1991-1995. The number of claims declined
46%, and insurance settlements declined by 29% (unadjusted for inflation).
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17% above their 1985 level before declining steadily. By 1996,
larceny was 38% below its 1985 rate, and over 50% below its
peak in 1988. Thus, larceny and nonfirearm robbery trends are
close in both shape and phasing. And, though phased three
years later, these trends reflect the general nonfirearm crime
decline observed earlier. Accordingly, a broad version of a "two
trend" theory may be consistent with trends in both robbery and
property crimes. The disjuncture between firearm and nonfire-
arm violence extends to robbery, while the longer-term down-
ward secular trend in nonfirearm crimes now appears to include
both violent and property offenses.
C. SOCIAL TRENDS
Both popular and social science explanations of the decline
of New York homicide rates have focused on important social
trends, particularly changes in drug markets and reductions in
the population of offenders with the greatest propensity for
homicide and gun violence. 10 There are two reasons that make
these explanations particularly attractive. First, homicide and
drug epidemics have been closely phased, both temporally and
spatially, in New York and nationwide, for nearly thirty years.1
Homicide peaks in 1972, 1979, and 1991 mirror three drug epi-
demics: heroin; cocaine hydrochloride (powder); and crack co-
caine. These long-term trends predict that declines in drug use
would occur contemporaneously with declines in homicide.
Second, the scale of broader social trends, such as demo-
graphic shifts, matches the social scale on which broad crime
trends rise and fall. Epidemic theories suggest that declines in
the size of the susceptible populations would lead to declines in
the incidence of social behaviors whose rapid rise above the
'0 See, e.g., Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods.
Crime, Violence, Drugs and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233
(1998).
"Jeffrey A. Fagan, Intoxication and Aggression, in M. TONRY &J. WILSON, DRUGS AND
CKiAE (Crime andJustice: An Annual Review of Research vol. 13, 1990);Jeffrey A. Fa-
gan, Continuity and Change in American Crime: Lessons from Three Decades, in U.S. DEP'T




base rate and equally rapid decline illustrate basic epidemic pat-
terns.'2
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare trends in firearm and nonfire-
arm homicide with trends in both drug activity and population
change. We compiled two trends of drug activity: drug overdose
deaths, from the records of the Medical Examiner, and trends
in drug-related crimes, based on urinalysis results from the Drug
Use Forecasting System (DUF). Figure 3.5 shows that the inci-
dence of drug-positive arrestees remains unchanged throughout
the period, and is unrelated to both firearm and nonfirearm
homicide trends. Moreover, nonfirearm homicides decline
steadily throughout the period, and appear to be independent
from either drug indicator.
In contrast; drug overdose deaths follow a-pattern of short
cycles, with relatively brief periods of increase and decline. For
example, by 1988, the incidence of drug overdose deaths is 60%
higher than the 1985 base rate.'3 They fall to 10% below the
base rate in 1990, then rise through 1993 and remain about
40% above the 1985 incidence.
The rise in drug overdose deaths seems to increase as the
incidence of firearm homicide deaths declines. By 1996, the in-
cidence of drug overdose deaths is 21% above the 1985 base,
while firearm homicide deaths are 22% below the 1985 base.
Beginning in 1990, the mortality rate for drug overdose deaths
rises from below 10 per 10,000 persons in 1985, peaks at 16 per
100,000 in 1993, and remains stable at 14.3 in 1996. During this
period, the homicide fatality rate drops from over 30 deaths per
100,000 to 16.1 in 1996. Indeed, as Richard Curtis and others
have pointed out, drugs such as heroin and ketamine sup-
planted crack as the favored street drug.14 These drugs are
"KENNETHJ. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY (1986); Colin Loftin, Assaultive Vzo-
lence as a Contagious Process, 62 BULL. OF THE N.Y. ACAn. OF MED. 550 (1986); Malcolm
Gladwell, The Tipping Point, THE NEwYORKER, June 3, 1996, at 32.
,3 The base year of 1985 is an important year, falling between the earlier emer-
gence of street-level powder cocaine markets and the explosion of crack cocaine in
1986.
'" Curtis, supra note 10, at 1266.
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more likely to cause overdose deaths.' 5
What appears as replacement, however, may simply be a
spurious relationship between firearm fatalities and drug over-
dose deaths. Drug use and selling have different correlations
with violence, and tend to motivate different types of violence.
Homicide rates associated with drug sales rose sharply during
the crack era, but violence associated with drug use remained
relatively infrequent.16 And, although many users were involved
in small-scale drug sales, most high-rate drug selling occurred
among infrequent drug users. 7
Accordingly, it is more likely that a decline in street-level
drug selling activity may have reduced, to some unknown ex-
tent, the types of social interactions that lead to firearm homi-
cides and assaults. It is less likely, however, that high violence
drug sellers turned to more lethal forms of drug use.
Figures 3.6a and 3.6b show the trends for firearm and non-
firearm homicides arrayed with population estimates for the
subgroups with the highest homicide risk: males 15-29 years of
age." Demographic trends appear to be unrelated to firearm
homicides. However, nonfirearm trends appear to coincide
with population declines among white and Black males. The
population projection for 1995 for Black males forecasts a 17%
" OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, NEw YORK Crry DEP'T OF HEALTH,
SUMMARY OFVITAL STATISTICS 1996, THE CY OF NEWYORK (1997).
"6 Paul J. Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually
Based Event Analysis, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 651 (1989);Jeffrey Fagan, Vrzolence as
Regulation and Social Control in the Distribution of Crack, in MARIO DE LA ROSA ET AL.,
DRUGS AND VIOLENCE (NIDA Research Monograph No. 103, 1990).
17 See Fagan, supra note 16, at 25.
'a Population subgroup estimates were obtained from the Current Population Sur-
vey for 1985, the U.S. Census for 1990, and population projections completed by the
New York Metropolitan Transportation Council for 1995. The latter were developed
to predict transportation demand. The population model uses a cohort-survival tech-
nique that adjusts for cohort mortality, natality, survival rates and net migration rates
at five-year intervals. Population is broken down into age-/sex-/race-specific cohorts
using the Census Bureau MARS data set. Separate projections are made for each
age/sex/race cohort. Population growth is based on forecasted age-specific fertility
rates for females. The net-migration component is a function of historical rates and
projected labor force demand segmented by type of job. See N.Y. MEMOPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION COUNCL, TRANSPORTATION MODELS AND DATA INIIAw, TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM No. 8.9: POPULATION FORECASTING AND ANALYSIS (1995).
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decline among males 15-29 years, or about 41,000 persons in ab-
solute terms. For whites, the decline is sharper: 130,000 fewer
males ages 15-29 are estimated to be living in New York City in
1995 than a decade earlier.
Can such declines produce the magnitude of homicide de-
cline observed in this decade? Population declines for the
highest risk groups, non-white males ages 15-29, were evident
throughout the period, beginning during the increase in fire-
arm homicide and continuing through the period of decline.
Accordingly, it is tempting to dismiss demography as a correlate
of the homicide decline. However, the relationship of popula-
tion to a changing behavioral pattern may be nonlinear.'9 In
other words, did the population decline reach a threshold
where it could lead to a decline in the incidence of firearm
homicides? 20 This is a plausible but unfalsifiable explanation.
Like the effects of declining drug markets, the contraction in
the highest risk population is an important but unknowable in-
fluence on the decline in firearm homicides from 1992-1996.
D. LAW AND POLICY
Significant changes occurred in law and criminal justice
during this period to produce important changes in the likeli-
hood of detection and punishment of crime. Rapid expansion
'9 See Gladwell, supra note 12, at 33.
20 Sustained declines in populations with the highest propensity for lethal violence,
males ages 15-29, might weaken their social networks and reduce the extent of social
interactions of their members. The social and spatial clustering of homicide suggests
that it is concentrated within overlapping social networks in small areas. Jeffrey Fa-
gan et al., Social Contagion of Youth Homicide in New York, in P.J. Cook & M. Moore, THE
EPIDEMIC OF YOUTH VIOLENCE: A SUBSTANTIVE AND INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE (1998).
Social contagion theory suggests that individuals are likely to mutually influence the
behaviors of others with whom they are in frequent and redundant contact. RONALD
S. BURT, SOCIAL CONTAGION (1992); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Con-
tagion Processes in an Organizational intervention, 49 HUM. REt. 1419 (1996). The social
interactions underlying assaultive violence suggest its spread by social contact. See
Loftin, supra note 12, at 554. The dissolution of social networks from attrition would
reduce opportunities for social transmission of assaultive violence. The relationship
of network density to social contagion is nonlinear, however. Thus, epidemiologists
discuss thresholds, or tipping points, where behavioral change accelerates and
spreads through a population before beginning its process of decline. See, e.g., Jona-
than Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and
Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM.J. SOC. 1226 (1991); Gladwell, supra note 12, at 34.
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of prison populations have occurred in nearly every state, in-
cluding New York.2' Moreover, New York City implemented an
aggressive policy of street-level enforcement against both drug
crimes in the 1980s22 and "quality of life" crimes in 1994.2 In
this section, we assess the relationships between these two policy
shifts and the trends in homicide.
1. Policing
Figure 3.7 shows the trends in policing over the 11-year pe-
riod. Changes in policing were unrelated to the long-term de-
cline in nongun homicides. This is a secular trend whose
explanations lie beyond the hypotheses raised here about post-
1990 interventions. But there are some apparent links between
police resources, firearm killings and crime rates, as well as po-
lice strategy and homicide trends. Patrol strength increased
from its 1991 count of 6,647 officers to over 8,305 officers in
1995, an increase of nearly 25%. Figure 3.7 shows that the in-
crease in patrol strength was sharpest from 1991 to 1994, the
period of onset of the decline in firearm homicides. In addi-
tion, marked shifts in policing strategy began in 1994,24 concur-
rent with even sharper declines in firearm homicides from 1994-
1996.
The influence of policing on homicide is evident in data on
the locations of homicides. The New York Police Department
records whether crime events are "visible by patrol"; we used
this indicator as a proxy for whether crimes occurred indoors or
outdoors. Increased patrol and aggressive patrol tactics should
reduce opportunities for visible or outdoor crime commission.
Figure 3.8 shows trends in homicides committed indoors and
outdoors, again using the 1985 incidence as a base of 100.
21 MIcHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr: RACE, CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 58-
66 (1995).
M. SVIRIDOFF ET AL., THE NEIGHBORHOOD EFECrS OF STREET-LEVEL DRUG
ENFORCEMENT: TACICAL NARcOTICs TEAMS IN NEwYORE. FINAL REPORT, NIJ GRANT 89-
IJ-CX-0056 (1992).
" See generally George L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOws:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMuNIms (1997).
1 Id. at 29.
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Visible homicides increased rapidly from 1986-1990, peak-
ing at 134% above the 1985 base rate. There were two periods
of decline, from 1991-1993, and a sharper decline from 1994-
1996 when they returned to the 1985 level. After a one-year rise
in 1986, nonvisible homicides fluctuated from 1987-1994 before
beginning a sharp decline. By 1996, nonvisible homicides were
52% lower than the 1985 incidence. We find no evidence of
displacement from outdoor to indoor homicide in these trends.
This represents a different "two trend" phenomenon with
potentially different explanations for two different periods in
this decade. From 1991-1994, there were two downward shifts in
exogenous events tied to homicides, especially those occurring
outdoors. The increase in patrol strength beginning in 1991
might have had a positive effect on reducing visible homicides.
The second pressure was tied to changes in the dynamics of
drug distribution. The decline in visible homicide was concur-
rent with the shift from outdoor to indoor drug selling, reduc-
ing the volatility of drug transactions and the opportunities for
conflicts over money or territory-25
The 1994-1996 decline coincides with changes in police
strategy. Combined with earlier downward pressures, the shift
toward an aggressive enforcement strategy targeted at firearms
might have produced sharp declines in both indoor and out-
door homicides.
2. Incapacitation
Both city and state incarceration populations are arrayed
with homicide trends in Figure 3.9. 26 During the period of in-
21 See generally BOURGOIS, supra note 6 ; Curtis, supra note 10, at 1262-63. Although
the "drug-relatedness" of specific homicides is difficult to determine, the direct and
indirect contribution of drug problems to homicide rates has been stable over time.
Goldstein, supra note 16, at 663. Changes in drug markets, as evidenced by shifts in
consumption patterns and marketing styles, should contribute to changes in homi-
cide rates. B.D. Johnson et al., Careers in Crack, Drug Use, Distribution and Non-Drug
Criminality, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 251 (1995).
26 Average daily populations are shown for the jail population in New York City,
and the year-end census is shown for the New York State Prisons. The percentage of
the New York State prison population that was New York City residents at the time of
commitment varies from 66.0% to 73.3% in 1996. See generally U.S. Dep'tJustice, Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics (last modified July 1998)
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creasing firearm homicide rates from 1985 through 1991, prison
and jail populations increased at the same pace. Jail popula-
tions declined from 1992-1994, a year after the onset of the gun
homicide decline. Jail populations then rose again in 1995 as
gun homicides continued to decrease. By 1995, jail admissions
were 50% higher than in 1985. State prison populations rose
throughout the period from 1985-1995. By 1991, when the in-
cidence of firearm homicides was highest, state prison popula-
tions had doubled the 1985 rate. That is, homicide and state
prison populations rose in lockstep through 1991, and contin-
ued to rise even as firearm homicides, and homicides overall,
began their rapid decline.
While firearm homicides and homicides generally began
their decline in 1992, state prison admissions continued to rise.
By 1993, they were nearly 150% higher than the 1985 rate, and
about 50% higher than the rate at the 1991 peak of the inci-
dence of homicide and other firearm-related crimes.
The extent to which these legal policies influenced homicide
trends differs by policy domain. Incarceration trends seem to
be unrelated to homicide trends. There appears to be a nega-
tive correlation between police strength and firearm homicide,
but the significance of these effects, or their primacy in relation
to social influences, is not knowable. The effects of both man-
power and tactical changes in policing may well be important
and strong contributors to the homicide decline. However, the
magnitude and timing of the decline in firearm homicides is so
great as to require additional, contemporaneous explanations
and effects that no doubt interact with policing to produce un-
precedented change.
<httn://www.oij.usdoi.gov/bis/prisons.htm>; Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't Justice,
National Corrections Reporting Program: Prison Admissions, Search of 1985-1996 Data Ar-
chives of the Inter-University Consortium for Political & Social Research (Jan. 13,
1999); NEWYORK STATE DEP'T CORRECTIONAL SERVS., HUB SYSTEM: PROFILE OF INMATE
POPULATION UNDER CusTODY ONJANUARY 1, 1997 (1997). New York City residents ac-
counted for 4.1% of all U.S. prison admissions from 1992-1996. Search of National
Corrections Reporting System Reporting System 1992-1996 Archives (Jan. 13, 1999).
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The identification of two separate types of homicide with
two discrete time trends is a major complication to theories that
wish to identify discrete causes of reduced violence and crime in
New York City. In this brief concluding note, we give our own
interpretation of how the "two trend" conclusion of this study
might be particularly relevant to the frequently voiced theory
that changes in policing that occur early in the 1990s are an im-
portant explanation of declines in New York homicide.
We start with our negative conclusion. The consistent de-
cline in nongun homicide identified in Part II starts too early
and continues too evenly throughout the period under study to
have any plausible linkage to changes that come into the city
two or three years into the 1990s. Indeed, the evenness of the
decline across a decade suggests the influence of an accretive
process rather than any sudden step-function change in the en-
vironment of New York city homicide was responsible for cut-
ting the nonfirearms homicide rate by half.
However, some important process is involved. There was no
indication of regression in this pattern because there was no
steep increase prior to 1985 in nongun homicide. Further, the
rate of nongun killing is much lower by 1992 than at any time in
the previous 15 years. The single or multiple processes that ex-
plain the decline in nongun homicide in New York City hap-
pened too *early to be in the design perspective of this research,
but they are no less important for that reason.
The more difficult question is whether the expansion in po-
lice resources and changes in the way these were used were ma-
jor causes of the decline in gun homicide in NewYork City. The
temporal fit between policing changes and gun homicide de-
clines is a good one. Gun homicides begin to decline in the
Medical Examiner's count in 1991, but the declines were not
large prior to 1994. Because of the steep increase in the gun
homicide rate through the late 1980s, some regression would be
expected from peak rates in 1990. So the initial declines in gun
killings could be put aside as probable regression leaving the
85% of the drop that happens after 1993 as gun homicide de-
clines that could have been produced by changing patterns of
1998] 1319
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policing in the city. We must also recall that police strength,
without new tactics, began a measurable climb at the same time
that firearm homicides began their decline. These colliding
forces produced a decline of unprecedented proportions that
continued through 1996 and beyond.
A. REGRESSION REVISITED
A little bit of regression might make the causal role of polic-
ing more likely, but regression is also a competing explanation
for the large drops in gun homicide after 1993. In Part I of this
analysis, the hypothesis that the total decline in New York City
homicide was attributable to regression was all but rejected be-
cause the decline by 1996 was to a level much lower than the
city's long-term average rate, and homicide rates were lower also
than the lowest previous level experienced in the past two dec-
ades. More than regression must have been at work when the
totality of the city's homicides are combined into a single trend.
But once nongun and gun homicide patterns are separated,
the regression explanation for gun homicides is more difficult
to reject. Figure 4.1 charts two decades of homicide volume in
New York City, separately for gun and nongun deaths.
To use a term introduced in Part I, the pattern of gun kill-
ings does rather resemble the shape of a rollercoaster, with an
ascent through the late 1970s to a relatively low peak, a return
to near the previous low point, a sharp increase to a high peak
in 1990 and a precipitous drop thereafter. What makes the re-
gression explanation harder to reject for gun cases is that the
1996 low point is not that far removed from 1978 and 1985 lev-
els of gun homicide.
There is no rigorous method available to parse causal re-
sponsibility between law enforcement, social trends, and regres-
sion for the city's gun homicide record. All contributed to the
decline, all were probably significant. What makes us reluctant
to dismiss the law enforcement role is the sharp decline also
noted in Part III in gun assault and gun robbery. These two of-
fenses may also reflect cyclical regression but the broad pattern
1320 [Vol. 88







oun°O S862 0o uo3OJ
FA GAN, ZIMRING & KIM
and similar magnitudes are consistent with a substantial envi-
ronmental change. So while the entire gun homicide drop of
1991 to 1996 is within the boundaries of regression possibility,
the more prudent view is to regard the convergence of cyclical
variation, social trends in risk and exposure, and law enforce-
ment changes as jointly responsible for a 60% decline in gun
deaths in five years time. How much of the decline can be
claimed by law enforcement alone simply cannot be deter-
mined.
Related to the problem of apportioning responsibility be-
tween regression, demography, and policing for the decline in
homicide, a substantial variety of changes in policing are com-
peting to claim credit for positive trends in New York's homi-
cide prevalence: "broken windows" theories of aggressive
enforcement, gun interventions, general increases in police en-
forcement resources, strategic targeting of police efforts
through computer mapping, and precinct-level management
accountability for crime trends. Was the police share in the
happy story graffiti control, squeegee control, gun control, or
simply more police?
Because only gun homicide trends are in range to be attrib-
uted to police intervention, the case for gun-oriented policing
strategies claiming credit is much stronger than for all other
policies, but this inference is subject to two qualifications. First,
a whole series of street enforcement tactics including stops justi-
fied on an order maintenance rationale can have gun-specific
results if police use them to produce gun search opportunities.
Second, we would also expect regression artifacts in New York
City to be much larger for gun cases than nongun cases. So
more than the differential success of police gun programs might
explain the concentration of trend change after 1992 in the gun
cases. Still, the pattern in New York City is much more consis-
tent with gun-oriented policing than with indiscriminate quality-
of-life interventions as a cause of decline.
The nongun declines are in all probability not the conse-
quence of policing changes or any other process that was not in
effect until the 1990s. So one important part of the city's homi-
cide decline was independent of the changes in the 1990s. If
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the origins of the nongun decline were better understood, per-
haps we could be more confident about the behavioral explana-
tions of the later gun homicide decline. But with this major
reduction in nonfirearms homicide unexplained, there is no
good reason to be confident in guessing about the specific
causes of the decline in gun killings. The trend in nongun
homicide for more than a decade remains a pleasant mystery
that shrouds the whole explanation of variations in New York
City homicide in fog.
Attributing nongun homicide declines to law enforcement
changes was premature and unjustified. Rather than risk more
precipitous error in the interpretation of the city's homicide
trends, our current understanding of the period from 1985 to
1996 suggests caution. If the downward trend in gun killings
continues far past the 1978 and 1985 levels, the probable role of
the mid-1990s changes will loom larger with each further de-
cline. If the nongun homicides also continue in their post-1986
pattern, however, even the best statistical data on New York
homicide will not yield easy answers on causation.
1.9981 1323
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